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EXPANDING CONCEPTS OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
FOREWORD-CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A NEW ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS
PHILIp B. KURLAND*

Ocean tides, I am told, are caused by the gravitational effect of
the sun, the moon, and the stars. Tidal reactions to the relative
positions of these heavenly bodies are sufficiently regular to be
predictable. There are also tides in judicial construction of the
Constitution. These, too, for all I know, may be affected by solar,
lunar, and stellar activities. But they are far from predictable.
We know what has happened. We may be able to ascertain what
is happening. But we are essentially at a loss to predict the details
of the future on the basis of the data that we do have. Efforts to
reduce constitutional law to doctrine are not only ineffectual. They
seem to be unwelcome. And this is especially true, we are told, in
the emotion-laden area of the application of the religion clauses of
the first amendment. It should not be surprising, therefore, that
current writing on this subject should emphasize direction rather
than doctrine.
The direction of recent judicial decisions on church and state is
clearer than the reasons given for them. Tolerance is the shibboleth. Or, if you prefer Mr. Justice Douglas's formulation in the
second released-time case, the magic word is "accommodation."
Accommodation is neither freedom nor separation. It is, instead, a
proposition reminiscent of Professor Thomas Reed Powell's restatement of the law of the commerce clause: the state may assist organized religions, but not too much; the state may inhibit religiously justified activities, but not too much. How much is too much is
beyond the power of restatement.
There are two factors that can be identified in the movement to
accommodation. The first is that the smaller the religious group,
the greater the requirement that the state accommodate to its
needs. (But it must be a religious group and not an individual
whose claim is asserted.) Certainly, the smaller the religious group,
the lower the price of accommodation and the less the threat of
its hegemony. The prime example of this principle, if it can be
called such, may be found in the California peyote cases, where it
was held that the state could not punish an Indian's use of peyote to
attain a hallucinatory state because his religion authorized such
use, but it could punish the use of the drug for the same purpose
by a nonmember of the sect. To take Professor Kalven's language
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from another context: it is "a sign of how tolerant toward a
sharply dissident minority our society could be, if the minority
were small and eccentric." But the caveat must be added that the
minority must not be too small or too eccentric.
The second identifiable element in the trend of decisions is that
the decision of how much is too much is to be that of the judiciary,
made largely without providing guidance for other situations.
There is, as yet, no calculus that reveals why a sect of X number
of members can receive special indulgence to dope themselves with
peyote, but a sect of X plus Y members cannot be indulged in their
religiously required polygamy.
This direction taken by recent judicial opinions may augur well
for the future. With the spirit of ecumenism advancing so rapidly,
it may well be that the only assurance of religious freedom and
separation of church and state is to be found in affording special
protection and privilege to a large number of nonconforming
religious organizations. For history reveals that religious freedom
has prospered only where there have been a multiplicity of religious beliefs and a large number of nonbelievers. It was in such an
atmosphere that religious freedom was born in this country. The
maintenance of similar conditions may prove essential to its continued existence. Such protection may be available only from the
courts, freed as they are from majority control.
It may well be, as I infer from the articles in this symposium, that
a new era of good feelings dominates the usually bitter contest between church and state, that "the voice of the turtle is heard in
our land." I should feel better if the turtle's language were less
like that of the Delphic oracle. Perhaps it should suffice that the
courts offer pragmatic answers to practical problems in applying
the religion clauses of the first amendment. Certainly that has
been the history of constitutional construction in this country.
Why should one expect more now?
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